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Abstract—Considerable work has been carried out into making
the vision of connected vehicles a reality, with inter-operable
communications to take place between vehicles for the purpose
of improving road safety and alerting road users to accidents
or sudden braking. The cost of deploying such a solution to
large numbers of vehicles is significant, and vehicles have a
much longer lifespan than other consumer equipment, leading to
other work considering the use of smartphones as possible devices
for such connected vehicle networks. In this paper, we consider
the security and privacy implications of using smartphone based
platforms for connected vehicle applications, both in vehicles, and
those carried by pedestrians. We also consider the general risks
of relying on consumer smartphones, particularly with regard to
the lack of long-term security updates being available. We finally
explore the need for privacy to be considered in the design of
solutions, in addition to the well-recognised need for security, and
explore the trade-off between anonymity and prevention of abuse,
in the context of designing future connected vehicle technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Considerable research and work has been carried out in
the field of connected vehicles [1], particularly with regard
to utilising this connectivity to share data between vehicles,
thus reducing road-traffic accidents [2] and improving traffic
flow [3]. Research has also highlighted concerns with regards
to the security of these networks [4]. Despite this, for con-
nected vehicles to benefit as many people as possible, it is
necessary to ensure that access to these communications is
as close to universal as possible. In [5] and [6], the need for
pedestrians to be included in collision-avoidance solutions is
considered, and models for the warning of both drivers and
pedestrians (via their smartphones) is given.
We expand upon these works, by considering the implica-
tions on user privacy when regular smartphones (or platforms
derived from these, such as Android Auto [7], intended to
introduce Android devices to vehicles) are used. The concept
of using Android-based smartphones as communications links
for connected vehicles as an interim measure until greater
adoption of IEEE 802.11p was proposed in [8]. This approach
has clear merit, given that the intended lifespan of a smart-
phone is significantly shorter than that of a vehicle. This means
that, even when connected vehicles become mainstream, there
will still be a significant period where many vehicles will not
be equipped with this technology, potentially reducing many
of the benefits of the technology.
Data transmitted and received by connected vehicles is
potentially safety-critical, especially with the advent of au-
tonomous vehicles, and the creation of road trains [9] meaning
that driving decisions may be made as a result of input received
from other vehicles. The security (namely, the authenticity and
reliability) of this data is therefore crucial for both the overall
network, and the occupants of the vehicle.
Additionally, a new security challenge is introduced when
considering connected vehicle safety applications, namely that
of quality of service. The ability for an attacker to even slightly
delay the transmission or reception of important signalling data
could potentially be as damaging as someone sending false
information. Given people are already sufficiently motivated
to deliberately cause vehicle collisions for the purpose of
claiming insurance money [10], there exists a clear motive
for malicious actors to attempt to, for example, delay braking
messages, in order to deliberately cause a crash. The ability to
interfere with, or delay the transmission of, vehicle-to-vehicle
messages, would only aid in carrying out these activities.
II. SMARTPHONE PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS
There has been considerable research into the lack of
user control over privacy on smartphones in recent years,
and indeed work has attempted to rectify these issues, in-
cluding techniques for privacy-preserving sharing [11], and
backwards-compatible optional permissions techniques [12].
Significantly, however, there has been little deployment of
user-facing privacy controls on Android handsets. This poses
a significant challenge for those attempting to use smartphone
handsets for use in connected vehicle environments, where it
is possible for other applications to (without the clear consent
of the user) choose to gather and centrally store data being
transmitted by connected vehicles, as is common in applica-
tions today [13]. Indeed, with various methods of ex-filtrating
data from an Android-based device [14] capable of bypassing
other privacy protection techniques, it is highly likely that any
data transmitted through a connected vehicle network could be
gathered and transmitted to central aggregation servers, where
that data is no longer under the control of the user.
This may have privacy implications for users, particularly
given the ease with which sensitive device identifiers (such
as IMEI and IMSI numbers) can be accessed and used to
uniquely identify an individual handset [13]. If an individual’s
movements could be correlated together at multiple points, it
would be possible for an adversary to potentially build up a
record of the movements of other individuals, thus violating
their privacy in a large scale.
Additionally, there is considerably fragmentation in the
issuance of firmware updates for smartphones. In May 2015,
only around 10% of Android devices were running Android
Lollipop, the most recent version of Android [15]. This is
despite it having been available since November 2014. This
is significant, since in a safety-critical application, prompt
firmware updates may be needed to address emerging security
threats, or to counter-act threats which are seen in the wild.
Indeed, over a quarter of Android devices in use as of May
2015 are running on an Android firmware released before
June 2012, meaning they lack 3 or more years’ worth of
security updates. With Android devices typically receiving
only a single major version upgrade, prior to their manu-
facturer ceasing to provide update support (including security
updates), there is significant risk to connected vehicles which
rely on the security of the individual vehicles concerned. This
risk is further exacerbated when one considers the security
implications of users not receiving timely and ongoing updates
for manufacturer-provided binary drivers, as discussed in [16].
In recent years, Google has started to distribute some key
components of the Android operating system through its Play
Store, offering app-like updates. Examples of this include
their own services framework, and the Chromium-based web
view. This is beneficial for the security of consumer-oriented
applications on devices, by ensuring devices can receive web
browser updates, long after their manufacturer has ceased to
provide firmware updates. Within the context of networking
pedestrians and vehicles through the use of smartphones,
however, this would not resolve the problems of security
vulnerabilities within the core frameworks of the operating
system (which require a new firmware image to update), the
Linux kernel in use on phones, and driver and hardware-
specific modifications. In particular, kernel-level exploits give
rise to the potential for malicious software to gain root access
(if a suitable bypass of SELinux is found), raising the prospect
of malicious software being able to interfere with the correct
operation of a smartphone application. Similarly, vulnerabili-
ties in outdated drivers (for example, the WiFi drivers) may
contain weaknesses which could give rise to attacks or denial
of service [16].
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF LATENCY
During transmission of critical data from a connected ve-
hicle (or a smartphone or other device acting as part of this
network), even a small additional component of client-side
latency may reduce the safety benefits of the system. For
example, the window of opportunity to avert an accident
between an overtaking and oncoming vehicle may be very
small depending on the speeds involved, and would be closely
linked to the transmission range between vehicles, and the
latency experienced by both vehicles handling the messages.
In order to achieve the best possible chance of averting such a
collision, it is important that communication latency between
vehicles is minimised as much as possible. In particular, the
round-trip latency is significant, on account of the need for
both parties involved in an exchange to communicate, prior to
potential for collision being detected.
By using a device which is not dedicated solely to the secure
communication of safety-related data to other vehicles, quality
of service issues arise. In order for smartphones to be viably
used as part of a vehicle-to-vehicle network, it is necessary
for there to be assurances as to how quickly a device will
respond to a particular stimulus over the network interface.
For example, a smartphone running in deep sleep mode in a
pedestrian’s pocket would need to be able to wake rapidly, in
order to process an incoming alert from a vehicle passing in
the road nearby. If this message was not processed in time, the
user may not be warned of the imminent danger. Nonetheless,
users have an expectation that their smartphone will have low
power consumption in sleep, and expect it to be responsive to
their own usage.
On account of this, and considering the difficulty in produc-
ing a suitably secure approach to retrofitting this to existing
smartphone handsets, we suggest it is be unwise to attempt
to proceed with using smartphones in a connected vehicle
environment, unless there were much stronger (and required)
assurances of timely security updates, and guaranteed response
times to incoming network messages. This is naturally of par-
ticular importance when used in a safety-critical application,
such as that of warning people of hazards developing around
them in real-time. For a cooperative safety system like that of
connected vehicles to work correctly, it is obviously important
that third parties should not be put at risk, on account of one
user’s older smartphone taking longer to respond to incoming
requests.
IV. ANONYMITY IN VEHICULAR COMMUNICATIONS
A protocol to allow for anonymity in vehicle-to-vehicle
communications is presented in [17]. In particular, the focus on
allowing for verifiable integrity and authenticity of messages
is given, although this technique relies upon a trusted central
authority, which is able to establish the identity of every
vehicle present, and is required to issue secure tokens to each
vehicle.
The question of whether or not full anonymity is desirable
in a connected vehicle environment is one which will no-doubt
be debated in the future, although we suggest two key factors
to be considered are:
• the maximum harm an anonymous actor can do, and the
consequences of this action, balancing the need to trace
the perpetrator
• users’ desire to travel without being pervasively tracked
and monitored at all stages of their journey
While clearly drivers do not currently have full anonymity
(vehicles are fitted with registration plates to allow for iden-
tification and tracing in the event of their drivers breaking
the law), the potential for the mass monitoring of users’
movements, either by other vehicles, or by road-side in-
frastructure, is a concern for users of connected vehicles.
Indeed, these concerns are already becoming evident as a result
of vehicle makers gathering data from currently available
internet-connected cars [18]. A survey by the University of
Michigan [19] revealed that 30% of respondents are “very
concerned” about security breaches and the risks of their
movements being tracked, and that a further 37% are “mod-
erately concerned” by this.
It is therefore clear that achieving user acceptance of con-
nected vehicle privacy will be an important factor in increasing
adoption of connected vehicle technology, particularly if that
technology is opt-in, through the voluntary installation of a
piece of software on their smartphone.
By offering users controlled a form of anonymity against
pervasive identification by other drivers or actors, privacy can
be preserved, albeit at the increased risk of potential attacks,
whereby malicious users may invent new identities, in order
to flood an area with invalid reports (thereby warning other
cars of false risks of collision). This is an ongoing challenge,
which is common in decentralised technologies, where there
is little barrier-to-entry for new users of a platform [20]. On
the other hand, if the risk posed by malicious users cannot
be mitigated, greater assurances of the origin of messages on
inter-vehicle networks may prove necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
Inter-connected vehicles remain a popular ongoing research
project, with many proposals having been made to accelerate
development and deployment through the use of consumer
smartphones as the network-connected nodes for vehicles and
pedestrians. We highlighted a number of concerns with this
approach, particularly around the security and privacy of user
data, and the risks of pervasive surveillance of data gathered
by smartphones, both by the operators and providers of
such software, and by other applications on smartphones. We
also highlighted the potential risks of using general-purpose
smartphones in time-critical operations concerning the safety
of individuals, as well as the trade-off between anonymity of
users, and the ability to detect malicious users having created
new identities to generate false messages on an inter-vehicle
network.
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